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Abstract
In the absence of enforceable contracts, many economic and personal
interactions rely on trust and reciprocity. Research shows that although
this reliance often works well, sometimes it breaks down. Simple rules
mandating minimum standards on reciprocation prevent the most
egregious trust violations, but may also undermine behavior that would
have otherwise produced higher overall economic welfare. We test the
efficacy of exogenously imposed minimum return rules using experimental
trust games. We find that rules fail to increase trust and trustworthiness.
Thus low minimum standards significantly decrease economic welfare.
Although sufficiently restrictive rules restore welfare, trust and trustworthy
behavior never returns.
JEL Classifications: C72, C91, D72
Keywords: trust games, experiments, reputation, information, reciprocity
* Corresponding author (email): schniter@chapman.edu
We thank Joyce Berg and John Dickhaut for inspiration, Ken Brown, Michael Gurven,
Abel Winn, Steve Gjerstad, Roberto Gonzalez, Bryce Corgnet and participants at the
14th International Conference on Social Dilemmas for their insight and suggestions. Any
errors are ours.

Most social and economic situations are not explicitly contracted (Davis, 1992). When
behavior is not mandated by enforceable rules, people tend to rely on reputations of
trust and trustworthiness.1 Even when rules exist, people often rely on trust to facilitate
interactions because it is often cheaper than a reliance on active monitoring and
enforcement. Spouses trust partners not to cheat. Drivers trust that oncoming traffic will
stay in the opposite lane. Investors trust businesses to act in the investors’ best
interests. Lenders trust borrowers to repay loans and depositors trust bankers to
behave responsibly. In trust-based situations, people likely use a norm-based2
propensity towards cooperation and constantly update these norms with information
gleaned from sophisticated evolved psychologies designed to detect cheaters
(Cosmides & Tooby, 1989 & 1992) and keep accounts of others’ goodwill exchange
efforts (McCabe & Smith, 2000, 2001, 2003).
Consider the two-player two-stage investment game of Berg, Dickhaut and
McCabe (1995), now widely known as the Trust Game. In the original game, an investor
can invest any portion of a $10 endowment by sending it to a trustee. Both investor and
trustee know that the amount sent triples in value before reaching the trustee. Having
received the tripled investment, the trustee can reciprocate by returning any portion of
the funds to the investor. Non-cooperative game theory predicts that because there is
no required return, investment will be foregone: anticipating that the trustee will keep all

1

Reputation, as it is concerned in this discussion, is an entity’s known history of demonstrating trust
and/or trustworthiness. Trust is demonstrated by willfully ceding resources or control to another with the
expectation that the other intends to reciprocate and not be opportunistic. Trustworthiness is
demonstrated by not succumbing to opportunism so as to restitute the resources or control that another
has ceded by extending trust. The amount of trustworthiness that can be demonstrated depends on the
amount of opportunism available.
2

In this paper, we use “norms” to mean context-based expectations about interactions that coordinate
behavior.
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funds received, the investor will invest zero. However, interactions in the trust game
rarely end this way. Typically, investors send a share of the endowment and most
trustees, in turn, reciprocate (Camerer, 2003). Given the high frequency of trustees who
reciprocate, a self-interested investor with accurate expectations of trustees may invest
rationally (Trivers, 1971; Kurzban & Houser, 2005). The development of norms among
socializing groups is not surprising given the widespread importance of trust and
reciprocity in everyday relationships. Axelrod (1984) demonstrates that an initially
trusting behavior, capable of contingent adjustment when the exchange partner proves
untrustworthy, can be an evolutionarily stable strategy. Research also shows the
importance of long-term reciprocity relationships and exchange of scarce and valuable
resources within small-scale subsistence societies (Kaplan et al., 1985; Hawkes et al.,
1991; Gurven, 2004). This supports the notion that reciprocal exchange has an ancient
origin and has been crucial to human evolution (Sahlins, 1972; Isaac, 1978; Lovejoy,
1981).3
While interpersonal interactions are often based on implicit trust-based
expectations of reciprocity and mental accounting of reciprocation histories, modern
society explicitly mandates many of the behaviors we rely on via formal rules and laws
(Zucker, 1986). When a system based solely on trust does not work efficiently enough
to prevent opportunism, we often rely on rules that establish minimum standards instead
of rules that fully specify behavior. For example, the USDA imposes a minimum
standard for meat inspection, corporations must meet minimum standards of disclosure

3

Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) and Cosmides and Tooby (1989) suggest that natural selection has favored
humans who had a propensity to establish reputations as cooperators and non-defectors, and who have
been capable of gathering reputational information about others on which to condition their trust based
exchange efforts.

2

to investors, and employers must pay a minimum wage. Minimum standards are
attractive because they outlaw the worst abuses of trust relationships while being less
costly than fully mandated interactions (both from compliance and enforcement
standpoints). However, when used, incentives such as those provided by minimum
standards may backfire (Bowles, 2009), leading a significant portion of people to
conclude something akin to “the minimum must be good enough, otherwise it wouldn’t
be the minimum,” thus lowering the median behavior from what it may have been
without a minimum rule.4
We study how exogenously imposed minimum return rules affect behavior in
experimental trust games. We modify the basic Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe (1995) trust
game in three additional treatments where there are minimum return rules that require
the trustee to return to the investor either 10%, 20% or 30% of the tripled investment
amount received. Our results suggest that these rules erode trust that would otherwise
occur. In most of the cases this erosion of naturally occurring trust and resulting
reciprocity was so large that it decreased overall economic welfare. When a minimum
return rule of 30% was imposed, which almost entirely removes downside risk, it did
manage to effectively restore economic welfare, however, neither trust nor trustworthy
behavior was restored.
In the baseline treatment with a mandated minimum-return of zero, subjects both
invested and reciprocated more than classic economic theory predicts. Typical investors
invested around half of their funds, signaling trust to trustees. Trustees who received
investments of more than half of the endowment returned a median of 45% of the

4

Recently, Fuster and Meier (2010) showed centralized norm enforcing mechanisms discouraged private
development of norms, and thus decreased cooperation.
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income, while the median return rate for those who received half or less of the
endowment was only 12% (note that a return of 33.33% or more of the income is a
positive return on investment for the investor).5 Thus, trustees reciprocated conditional
on amounts invested in a manner consistent with previous findings (Berg, Dickhaut and
McCabe., 1995; Pillutla, et al., 2003). When mandated minimum returns were greater
than zero, both return rates and investment distributions were affected. The 10% and
20% return rules actually resulted in smaller investments overall, while the largest 30%
rule resulted in larger investments. Return rates by trustees who received more than
half of the investor’s endowment were comparatively smaller for 10% and 20% return
rules. Compared to the 0% rule, trustees who received half or less of the investor’s
endowment had even lower return rates under 10% and 20% rule conditions. Trustees
returned amounts close to the mandated minimum (10% median amount returned with
the 10% rule, 24% with the 20% rule, and 30% with the 30% rule), as if believing the
“minimum must be good enough.”
In the next section, we review literature suggesting that rules may have
unintended consequences in a variety of situations. In Section II, we present our
experimental design, procedures and hypotheses. Sections III and IV contain our results
and analyses. We summarize and discuss implications and future research in the last
section.

5

Returns can be defined from the point of view of the trustee or the investor. We define the “return rate”
as the percentage of the amount received that is sent back by the trustee. Our rules are defined on return
rates. We define “return on investment” as the rate of net profits on invested funds, that is the returned
amount minus the investment divided by the investment. While there is a one-to-one correspondence
between these measures, return rates are more intuitive when discussing behavior of trustees and
returns on investment are more intuitive when discussing behavior of investors. See Table 2 for details.
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I

Literature Review

Since introduced by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), the trust game has been the
topic of intense research. A comprehensive review is beyond the scope of this paper but
available elsewhere (e.g., Ostrom and Walker, 2003) for interested readers.
Research in several areas suggests that institutionalized structures may actually
increase the very behavior they are designed to avoid. For example, Titmuss, Oakley
and Ashton (1997) suggest that providing financial incentives to give blood results in
less blood contributions than with no remuneration. Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008)
provide supporting evidence from women’s blood donations that these institutionalized
incentives backfire. Gneezy and Rustichini (2000a) give another excellent example:
when a formal rule (enforced by a fine) was implemented against late pick-ups, more
parents (not fewer) picked up children late from day care. In the labor context, several
studies (Frey, 1993; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008; Griffith, 1993) show that imposing
monitoring or close supervision by authority actually decreases work effort. The
“crowding out” of intrinsic motivation noted in these monitor-worker relationships may
result from the reduced opportunity for the worker to demonstrate trustworthiness.6
These examples demonstrate that, where behavior is not primarily controlled by
reputational concerns, but instead is mandated by adherence to institutional structure
and a calculus of its consequence, counter-productive effects may result.
In a game closely related to the trust game, Falk and Kosfeld (2006) studied the
effect of a principal imposing a minimum performance requirement on an agent. In this
6

High work effort provides an opportunity for demonstrating trustworthiness when a worker is not being
monitored and could otherwise shirk responsibility. A closely monitored worker does not have the same
opportunity to escape reprimand for shirking and so, under supervision, work effort does not serve to
indicate trustworthiness.
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principal-agent game, if the agent engages in a costly (to the agent) production process,
he can increase the payoff to the principal. The principal can set a minimum effort level
for the agent before the game begins. Falk and Kosfeld argue that setting a minimum
effort level signals mistrust to the agent while setting no minimum signals trust and
generates reciprocating behavior. In a control treatment, they exogenously set the
minimum production level. In this treatment, the principal is not signaling mistrust by
setting the minimum level. They find that, when restricted by the principals, agents
actually delivered lower production for the principal than when they were unrestricted. If
the restriction is imposed exogenously, production levels are similar to those observed
when the principals choose not to restrict the agents.
Finally, Fehr and Rockenbach (2003) modified the trust game to allow investors
to specify a “desired return” when sending money to trustees. In one treatment, the
desired return is simply non-binding communication. In another, investors can impose a
fine on trustees if the actual returned amount falls short of the desired return. Investors
decide whether the fine will be imposed ex-ante and trustees learn this decision at the
time of their choice. Thus, reliance on a fine signals mistrust to trustees. In either case,
the desired return rate serves to communicate the specific expectations of investors.
Return rates fall when a fine is set ex-ante and rise when a fine is not set. Thus,
implementing sanctions reduces reciprocity, but both the desired return set by investors
and whether a fine is implemented signals expectations and investor trust. Whether a
rule alone matters is thus confounded making it impossible to isolate the effect of the
rule alone on the trust/reciprocity relationship. In contrast, our rule treatments
exogenously set a minimum level that cannot be violated. Thus, the minimum may set

6

the expectations of both players, but does not serve to communicate expectations from
one party to the other.
The general idea embedded in the Falk and Kosfeld (2006) and Fehr and
Rockenbach (2003) work, that rules have adverse consequences, is similar to our
thesis. However, there are several important differences. First, by using and
manipulating the trust game, we can separate trust and control. By setting the rule in
their main treatment, the principal in Falk and Kosfeld’s game signals mistrust to the
agent. Like their control treatment, our return rule is exogenous, neither signaling trust
nor distrust. In their control game, the principal makes no decisions and, as a result,
neither signals trust nor distrust. In our game, the investor is still signaling trust in the
trustee by sending money. Thus, in both versions of our game, sending money signals
trust to the trustee. These differences are important to consider in situations where rules
are designed to replace or work in conjunction with internal motivations.
II
A

Experimental Design, Hypotheses and Procedures
Experimental Procedures

The experiment was conducted at Chapman University’s Economic Science Institute.
Subjects who had not previously been recruited for trust-game experiments were
recruited from a standard subject pool consisting primarily of undergraduate students
and randomly assigned into treatments described in Table 1. Subjects interacted with
each other anonymously over a local computer network. The experiment was
programmed and conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). The computers were
placed within individual cubicles in such a way that all subjects could only view their
own computer screen.
7

The eight sessions each consisted of 18 to 24 subjects, lasted approximately
thirty-five minutes, and were sequenced as follows. First, an experimenter read the
instructions aloud while each subject followed along with their own copy of the
instructions. The instructions explained the experimental procedures and payoffs used
in the experiment (instructions are available in the appendix). After finishing the
instructions, subjects were given five minutes to write down their answers to several
questions to ensure that they understood the instructions. Subjects’ answers remained
confidential from other subjects. After subjects completed the quiz, the experimenter
distributed a printed copy of the correct quiz answers. The experimenter privately
answered any questions regarding the experimental procedures.
Each subject was assigned a role, labeled person 1 for the investor and person 2
for the trustee. The subjects participated once in the trust game described below. Each
subject was paid a $7 participation fee and the payoffs from the trust game after signing
a receipt. On average subjects earned $9.75 in addition to their participation fee.
B

Experimental Design

Subjects participated in one of the four treatments. In each treatment, the investor could
send any portion of his $10 endowment to the trustee and the investment amount was
tripled on the way. The trustee then decided how much to send back contingent upon
the minimum return rule. In the baseline treatment (R0), the trustee could send back
none of the amount received. In treatments R10, R20 and R30 trustee had to send back
at least 10%, 20% and 30% of the tripled investment amount received, respectively.7

7

A button was placed upon the trustees’ screen that, if selected, would trigger a pop-up window displaying
the minimal amount that could be returned.
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C

Hypotheses

If investors and trustees behaved strictly according to classical economic theory, the
rules we impose should make no difference. In the single shot games we study, income
maximizing trustees would arguably have no incentive to return more than the rule
imposes. For the parameter values of the rules we use, the returns that equal the
minimum mandated return would result in loses for investors and, therefore, investors
would be expected to invest nothing in the first place. Of course, prior research on the
game shows that these expected behaviors are not typical. Instead, there is a
distribution of voluntary trustee return rates that on average justifies some positive initial
investment. Our first set of hypotheses therefore concerns how minimum required return
rules affect this distribution of trustee return rates.
Given the distribution of voluntary trustee return rates that typically arises without
a rule, any minimum return rule might mechanically truncate the lower tail of this
distribution. Our first hypothesis is that a minimum return rule leaves all other aspects of
the rule-free distribution unaffected. We call this the “truncation” hypothesis. This would
increase the mean return but, unless the median return is truncated, it would leave the
median unaffected.
Alternatively, Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) observe that reported social
histories increase return rates even when the histories reveal that some prior subjects
returned zero and the average return on investment is negative. The social histories
seem to reinforce norms of reciprocity. It is possible that minimum return rules also
reinforce reciprocity.8 Minimum return rules may suggest selfish behavior is

8

In other contexts, rules have been shown to have both positive and negative potential effects on
otherwise cooperative behaviors. For example, Ostrom (2000) discusses some situations where poorly
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unacceptable or undesirable, reinforcing pro-social behavior and resulting in greater
reciprocation. In this case, minimum return rules will both (1) truncate the lower tail and
(2) increase return rates in the rest of the distribution as well. We call this the
“reinforcement” hypothesis. Observationally, this would increase both the mean and
median return rates.
In contrast, if rules substitute for norms, the incentives presumably provided by
rules may backfire as Bowles (2009) suggests. That is, the mandated return rate
increases the noise-to-signal ratio for trustees wishing to gain reputations as
cooperators and limits the reputational benefits to trustees of costly signaling via returns
(Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Rules may cause trustees to abandon their own norms of
how much to return, substituting the rule instead. Alternatively, rules may serve as focal
points, attracting the entire distribution of return rates. In either case, while minimum
return rules truncate the lower tail of the distribution, they also pull down the rest of the
distribution toward the rule as well. We argue that this effect may hold in a strong form
wherein the rule completely replaces other norms and return rates fall to the rule. We
call this the “pure replacement” hypothesis. It may also hold in weak form, where the
rule partially substitutes for norms of behavior, but does not completely replace norms
of reciprocating. We call this partial substitution the “attraction” hypothesis.
Observationally, this will decrease the median return. Two factors affect the mean:
truncation of the lower tail and the downward shift in the rest of the distribution. The
overall effect on the mean is ambiguous for the attraction hypothesis, but complete and

designed external rules have negative impacts, but appropriately designed internally developed and
enforced rules may increase cooperative behavior in common pool resource games.
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partial substitution are the only cases where the mean may actually fall because of a
minimum return rule.
The following four alternative hypotheses summarize the posited effects of rules
on return rates.
Hypotheses Set 1: Effect of Rules on Return Rates
Truncation Hypothesis: Minimum return rules truncate the lower tail of the
return rate distribution as mandated by the rule and leave other aspects of the
distribution unaffected. As a result, the mean return rate increases from R0 through R30
and the median is unaffected unless it would otherwise have fallen below the rule.
Reinforcement Hypothesis: When a minimum return rule is implemented it (1)
eliminates returns that would otherwise have fallen below the rule and (2) also
reinforces norms of reciprocating, increasing return rates that would otherwise have
fallen above the rule. As a consequence, the mean and median return rates increase
from R0 through R30 because of upward shifts in the entire distribution.
Pure Replacement (Complete Substitution) Hypothesis: When a minimum
return rule is implemented, it completely replaces norms of reciprocating more than the
rule dictates. As a result, all return rates equal the mandatory minimum, decreasing the
mean and median return rates to the rule. As the rule increases, return rates will
increase accordingly.
Attraction (Partial Substitution) Hypothesis: When a minimum return rule is
implemented it (1) eliminates returns that would otherwise have fallen below the rule,
but also (2) substitutes partially for norms of reciprocating, effectively decreasing returns
that would otherwise have fallen above the rule by attraction towards the minimum
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allowed. Specifically, the further a minimum return rate is below the “default” level of
return rate otherwise seen in R0, the more it will lower the return rate. As a
consequence the median return rate decreases because of the downward shift in the
distribution above the rule. There is an ambiguous effect on the mean because, while
returns above the rule are shifted downward, returns below the rule are raised. As rules
increase to their maximum possible levels, both mean and median return rates will
ultimately increase because eventually the truncation effect must dominate for
sufficiently high rules.
Our second set of hypotheses concern investor behavior. If investors are
categorically predisposed to never invest, or believe that given their investment levels
return rates will not be changed by minimum return rules, then rules should not affect
investor behavior. These predictions form our “neutral” hypothesis.
By imposing an explicit rule mandating minimum returns on investment, we
unarguably decrease the downside risk to the investor. Specifically, R0 leaves the entire
investment at risk, while R10, R20, and R30 leave 70%, 40%, and 10% of the original
investment at risk, respectively. If investors respond solely to the value-at-risk, rules
should increase investment. We call this the “value-at-risk” hypothesis. A similar
outcome would arise if investors believed in the reinforcement effect on trustee behavior
(see reinforcement hypothesis above), encouraging a stronger investment response.
Alternatively, rules can create incentive tradeoffs by simultaneously limiting
downside risk (encouraging investment) while also constraining information gathering
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opportunities (discouraging investment)9, leading to a “U-shaped” investment response
function. Minimum return rules decrease the availability of discretionary funds on which
trustees can make decisions. As trustees are increasingly constrained with regards to
the proportion of income that they can decide to return, investors are consequently
provided less of the reputational information about what could have been done but was
not. At the same time, the mandated return rate increases the noise-to-signal ratio for
investors desiring to gain reputations as cooperators, lowering reputational benefits
gained from exhibiting trust (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). In accord with evolutionary
theorists (Axelrod & Hamilton, 1981; Cosmides & Tooby, 1989), we propose that natural
selection has favored humans who had a propensity to establish reputations as
cooperators and non-defectors, and who have been capable of gathering reputational
information about others on which to base their trust based exchange efforts (see also
discussions of “Goodwill Accounting” in McCabe & Smith, 2000, and Coricelli, McCabe
& Smith, 2000). According to this theory, both the presence of potential monetary gains
and reputational knowledge to be gleaned from risky investment in a novel exchange
partner, both parts of the trust game, evoke trusting behavior. Specifically, the
“information” hypothesis proposes that investors in the trust game are not only making
choices that will generate material gains from payouts, but are also making choices
which will generate reputational information about the trustee with whom they can
interact. A trade-off between downside risk and information seeking benefits causes a
U-shaped investment response function according to the “information” hypothesis.

9

It is also possible that investors may have beliefs that rules will shift the entire distribution of return rates
according to the substitution hypotheses. Such beliefs can also discourage investments.
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Finally, we note that the economic efficiency of this institution is driven entirely by
the investment rates. Thus, efficiencies move in lockstep with investment rates. So, any
hypothesis on investment rates applies equally to levels of economic efficiency.
The following three alternative hypotheses summarize the posited effects of rules
upon investments and the resulting efficiency.
Hypotheses Set 2: Effect of Rules on Investment Rates and Efficiency
Neutral Hypothesis: Investment levels do not respond to minimum return rules.
Value-at-Risk

Hypothesis:

Investors

respond

to

rule-truncated

return

distributions with monotonically higher investment levels as rules increase from R0
through R30.
Information Hypothesis: Minimum return rules create incentive trade-offs by
simultaneously limiting both downside risk and information seeking benefits. These
tradeoffs result in a U-shaped investment response function.
We test these hypotheses using the observed distributions of return rates and
investment levels. First, we ask how the return on investment varies with the rule and
investment levels.. Second, prior research suggests a more complex relationship
between investment levels and returns than our simple hypotheses do. In particular,
starting with Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995), researchers have noted that higher
investment levels generate both higher absolute returns, higher return rates and higher
returns on investment. We believe that higher investment levels generally signal more
trust and, in response to more demonstrable trust, trustees reciprocate with more
trustworthiness (returning more than the minimum). However, rules like the ones
implemented in this study affect the amounts of trust and trustworthiness that can be

14

demonstrably signaled. Rules restrict the discretionary space that trustees have
available for demonstrating reciprocation. If investors trust because they are seeking
information about trustworthiness and rules about mandated minimum returns decrease
this information content, then rules, investment levels and return rates will interact in a
complex way. We investigate these relationships more fully with a regression analysis.
III

Results

Table 2 gives several definitions that we use in the discussion of investments and
returns. Figure 1 shows the mean and median amounts sent and returned under each
rule. Examining the trustee and investor behaviors we find the “U-shaped” responses
predicted by some hypotheses. Next, we closely examine impact of rules on returns and
investments.
A

Effect of Rules on Return Rates

Figure 2 shows the distribution of return rates (defined at the percentage of funds
received that are returned by the trustee) under each rule. The two colors in the
histogram bars represent return rates when the investment levels were above or below
$5 (50% of the initial endowment). Evidently, rules affect return rates.
Under a 0% minimum return rule, there are two modes, one near 0% and one
centered somewhat below 50%. Table 3 Panel A gives the overall mean return ($6.65
or 29% of the amount received), median return ($7.00, 35%) and the percentage of
observations where the return rate was within $0.01 of 0% (17%). It also shows the
median excess return rate above the mandated minimum. We interpret this as
trustworthiness. In this case, it is simply the median return rate (30%) because the
minimum required return is 0%.
15

Under a 10% minimum return rule, there remain some returns in the 35% to 50%
range, but the dominant mode is 10%. The mean return drops (to $4.36, 22%) as does
the median (to $1.50, 10%). The median excess return rate falls to 0% because more
than half (57%) of the subjects return within $0.01 of the 10% minimum mandated
return rate. Thus, as represented by the discretionary returns above the mandated
median rate, trustworthiness disappears for the typical trustee. That is, the rule drives
out otherwise trustworthy behavior.
Under the 20% and 30% rules, the return rate distribution is forced up by the rule,
but the dominant mode remains the rule. The excess median return rates are 7% and
6%, far below the 35% excess median return rate that arose under a 0% rule. Thus,
voluntary discretionary reciprocity (trustworthiness) never returns to the levels observed
under the 0% rule.
In summary, the immediate effect of a low minimum return rule is to decrease the
mean and median return rates, reduce the level of reciprocity and increase the
percentage of trustee’s who return no more than the minimum required. As the
minimum rule increases, the mean and median return rates rise mechanically as a
result, but reciprocity remains low while the percentage of trustees returning no more
than the rule remains high. Unambiguously, rules reduce trustworthiness. A KruskalWallis Test (given in Table 3 Panel A) shows that these effects show up as significant
differences in the distributions of return rates. This pattern is only consistent with the
weak form of the substitution hypothesis giving our first result:
Result 1: Rules have significant effects on the distribution of return rates that are
consistent only with the attraction hypothesis.
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Figure 2 shows that under all rules, the distribution of return rates under each
rule is higher conditional on the amount sent being larger than $5. Comparing Table 3
Panel A to Panel B shows that the mean, median and median excess return rates are
uniformly lower when the investor sends less than $5. The percentage of trustee’s who
return the minimum is uniformly higher. While return rates are universally lower, rules
still have a significant impact on the distribution of return rates in this subsample.
Comparing Table 3 Panel A to Panel C shows that the mean, median and median
excess return rates are uniformly larger when the investor sends more than $5. The
percentage of trustee’s who return the minimum is uniformly lower. However, in this
subsample, rules do not appear to have a significant impact on the return rate
distribution. This leads to our second result:
Result 2: Return rates and levels are affected by the amounts sent.
In both Table 3 Panel B and Panel C, the mean return rates drop between the
0% and 10% rules. Then, they rise as the rule increases. For investments of less than
$5, a Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic on return rates is 11.597 (3 d.o.f.) with a p-value <
0.01. In contrast, for investments of $5 or more, the statistic is 5.174 (3 d.o.f.) with a pvalue of 0.1595. Thus, the impact of rules on overall return rates is highest for low
investment levels, leading to our third result:
Result 3: Rules affect the overall return rates most significantly when low
amounts are invested.
In both Table 3 Panel B and Panel C, rules decrease the median excess return
rates that represent voluntary discretionary reciprocity or trustworthiness. For
investments of less than $5, a Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic on excess return rates is
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5.060 (3 d.o.f.) with a p-value of 0.1675. In contrast, for investments of $5 or more, the
statistic is 16.984 (3 d.o.f.) with a p-value < 0.01.10 Thus, in contrast to the total return
effect, the impact of rules reducing trustworthiness is highest when high amounts are
invested.
Result 4: The trustworthiness reducing effect of rules is strongest for high
amounts invested.
Combined, Results 3 and 4 tell a particularly interesting story. Rules have a large
impact on overall return rates (Table 3, Panel A), but this shows up primarily when
investors show little trust (Table 3, Panel B). Overall return rates drop significantly under
the 10% rule and then rise as the rule increases (Result 3). But, this rise is primarily
driven by the direct effect of the rules increasing the mandatory return rates. The
discretionary return rate is low when investors invest less (i.e. <$5) regardless of the
rule (Result 4). In contrast, overall return rates are high when investors invest $5 or
more (Table 3 Panel C). The substitution effects seen between rules and
trustworthiness (discretionary return rates) offset each other as rules are imposed and
increased. However, even when investors invest more than $5, trustworthiness drops
dramatically when rules are imposed and stays low as rules rise. We explore this in
greater detail in the multivariate analysis in Section IV.
B

Effect of Rules on Investment Levels

Table 4 Panel A gives the overall mean and median investor (net) profit rates, defined
as the investor’s payoff minus the endowment divided by the endowment. Under the 0%
rule, the mean profit rate is near zero (mean=1.7%) and the median is zero. Under the
10% and 20% rules the mean and median are negative. Under the 30% rule typical
10

In running this test we round the excess return rate to four decimal places, as the subjects were
required to return amounts in penny increments. Allowing increased decimal places alters the number of
ties, and thus reported statistics, but does not alter significance or interpretation.
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profit rates achieve their highest value (mean=15.9% and median=6.3%) and return to
positive levels. If the rule is intended to avoid investors’ losses, it is ineffective unless
the minimum return rate is sufficiently high.

19

Table 4 Panels B and C give the overall mean and median profit rates when the
amount sent is less than $5 and greater than or equal to $5. For lower levels of
investment in Panel B, rules seem to positively increase profitability, but at higher levels
of investment the effect is non-monotonic. Overall rules initially dampen profit rates in
R10 and R20 compared to R0, but profits return with R30.
Result 5: Investor net profit rates fall when a rule is first imposed, then rise as
the rule rises.
What drives this U-shaped result? Is it the investors changing their investment
pattern? Or do returns on investment change? To gain insight we decompose investor
profit rate into two components: investment rate and return on investment (defined in
Table 2). Investment levels create the opportunities for profit, while the returns on
investment proxy for reciprocity indicating directly whether investments are justified. We
examine each separately.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of investments under each rule. The two colors in
the histogram bars represent investments with positive versus negative net returns on
investment. Clearly, rules affect the investment distributions with the largest apparent
impact arising under the 30% rule, where only 10% of the investment is at risk. Under a
0% minimum return rule, there is a fairly disperse distribution of investments with modes
at $0, near $4 and $10. Most of the investments of more than $5 are profitable.
Table 4 Panel A gives the overall mean investment rate (55.4%), median
investment rate (45.0%) and the percentage of observations where the investment was
zero (14%) under a 0% minimum return rule. It also shows the mean (-12%) and
median (0%) overall return on investment. The results here accord with prior research.
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The median investor invests just under half of the endowment and approximately breaks
even.
Under the 10% minimum return rule, the investment distribution remains
disperse, but drops on average (mean=46.0%, median=38.8%). Returns on investment
drop significantly (mean=-29%, median=-65%). With a lone exception, positive returns
on investment only accrue to investors who invest $7 or more. Because the investment
level falls, investors are responding to the rule but not according to the value-at-risk
hypothesis. Under the 20% and 30% rules, the investment distributions come back up
as do typical returns on investment. Only under the 30% rule do the mean and median
returns on investment exceed those observed under the 0% rule.
In summary, the immediate effect of a low minimum return rule is to decrease
investment levels and returns on investment. As the minimum rule increases, the mean
and median investment levels rise as do the returns on investment. However, only for
the highest rule do the overall returns on investment rise above the 0% rule. As with the
return rates, we observe a “U-shaped” response function. A Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic
shows that the effect is significant. The shape is only consistent with the information
hypothesis. This gives our next result:
Result 6: Rules have significant effects on the distribution of investment levels
that are consistent only with the information hypothesis.
Because there is a one-to-one direct relationship between investment rates and
efficiency, the same result holds for economic efficiency. The implication is that if the
rule is intended to encourage investment and economic efficiency, it is ineffective until
the minimum return rate is sufficiently high. Consistent with Gneezy and Rustichini
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(2000a), and Falk and Kosfeld (2006), instituting a (weak) rule has the unintended
consequence of dampening behavior the institution was promoting.
In Table 4, we report two measures of return on investment, for both all and only
positive amounts sent. Regardless of the metric, we find initially that rules erode median
returns on investment regardless of the amount invested. Increasing rules generally
increase returns on investment. As shown in Panel A this effect is significant overall.
However, the effects are not significant for high investment levels as shown in Panel C.
Result 7: Overall, the returns on investment are “U-shaped” with respect to rules.
While there is a significant relationship for low investment levels, there is no significant
relationship for high investment levels.
Notice that the mixture of investment levels changes with the rule. Trustees
respond to higher investment levels with higher returns on investment (trustworthiness).
There are relatively more high investment investors under a 30% rule than a 10% rule.
In Panel B note that average returns on positive investments are negative and almost
mirror the value-at-risk for low investment levels when rules other than zero are
implemented. Consequently, if the rule is intended to protect investors, it is ineffective
until the minimum return guaranteed is sufficiently high. The combined shift in
investment levels and trustee responses across rules explains the significance overall.
We explore this in more detail in the regression analysis next.
IV

Regression Analysis

Our analysis so far suggests that outcomes are driven by three effects: (1) rules directly
affect trustee returns by imposing a floor; (2) rules affect investment levels; (3)
investment levels affect trustworthiness as measured by the discretionary returns given
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by trustees. The first is a direct rule effect on returns. The second and third create an
indirect effect. Of course, there may be interaction effects as well. These are illustrated
in Figure 4. First, we will estimate the effect of rules on investment and trust, then
estimate the combined effects of rules, investment and trust on return rates and
trustworthiness.
A

Investment and Trust Levels

Our prior analysis suggests a non-linear relationship between rules and investment
levels and the distribution of investments are decidedly non-normal. Thus, we estimate
the relationship between the rule and investment level using median regression of a
quadratic function, giving the following estimated relationship:
(1)
where t-statistics are given below each coefficient, “***” denotes significance at the 99%
level of confidence and Rule is measured as a decimal.
However, investment does not necessarily indicate a high degree of trust. High
investment under a high minimum return rule may reflect a high level of assurance as
reflected by the minimum return rate. We argue that trust based investments occur
when one willingfully cedes resources with the expectation of being reciprocated by
another (more often than not accompanied by expected profits), though it is known that
other could opportunisitically profit. is deliberately making oneself vulnerable. This form
of trust may be better proxied by the total value the investor puts at risk as a
consequence of chosen investment level. Using value at risk as the dependent variable
gives similar results:
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(2)
where t-statistics are given below each coefficient, “***” denotes significance at the 99%
level of confidence and Rule is measured as a decimal. Of course, some of the rule
effect here is mechanical. For any given level of investment, the VAR is lower with a
higher rule.
In either case, the negative coefficient on Rule captures the decrease in
investment level and trust between a 0% to 10% rule and the positive quadratic
coefficient captures the curvature. Figure 5 shows the mean, median and estimated
median (according to equation 1) investment levels along with the maximum value at
risk for each rule (which directly reflects the percentage of the investment at risk). The
predicted and actual median investment levels track closely. The immediate effect of
imposing a rule is to decrease the investment level. As the rule increases, the
percentage of the investment that is at risk falls and the investment levels rise in
response. Figure 6 presents a similar graph for the total value that the investor places at
risk. Again, predicted and actual levels track closely. Minimum return rules cap the total
value that can be placed at risk, thereby decreasing the percentage of potential value at
risk. The end result is an overall inverse relationship between the rule and value placed
at risk.
B

Return Rates and Trustworthiness

Prior analysis suggests that rules affect trustee behavior in a non-linear fashion. Using
similar analysis as in estimation of equations (1) and (2), we estimate a median
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regression assuming quadratic relationship for the percentage of funds returned by
trustees (Return Rate) and rules:
(3)
where t-statistics are given below each coefficient, “**” denotes significance at the 95%
level of confidence and Rule is measured as a decimal. The number of observations
has fallen because Return Rate is not defined if the investment level is zero.
Similar to prior research, trustees return about a third of funds received without a
rule (more properly, with a 0% minimum return rule). This makes the investor break
even for the median trustee. The negative coefficient on Rule captures the decrease in
return rates moving between 0% to 10% rules and the positive quadratic coefficient
captures the curvature. While there is significant curvature, the estimated median return
rate (according to equation 3) in Figure 7 does not match the data nearly as well as the
estimated investment rate (from equation 1) in Figure 5. This suggests that there is
significantly more to determining median return rates than the rule alone.
Indeed, we would not expect rules alone to explain behavior. We hypothesize
that there is a complex direct, indirect, and interaction effect between rules, investment
levels or trust, and returns. The simplest way to consider these effects in terms of
estimation and interpretation of the result is to estimate the direct trust effects at the
same time as the direct rule and interaction effects of Figure 4. We start with a median
regression, measuring return rates as the percentage of funds received that are actually
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returned by the trustee and using investment level as the independent variable.11 This
results in the following estimated relationship:
−5.56% + 5.56%Investment
Return
−1.16
8.63***
=
+106.34%Rule
−13.97%Interaction
+ε
Rate
3.91***
−4.13***

Obs. = 82
Pseudo R 2 = 28.60%

(4)

where t-statistics are given below each coefficient, “***” denotes significance at the 99%
€ level of confidence, Investment is measured by the amount sent, Rule is measured as a

decimal and Interaction is Investment times Rule.12
According to the Pseudo R2, including investment and interaction terms in this
regression results in much more explanatory power. The result shows a positive impact
of rules on overall return rates. There is also an indirect effect through the significant,
positive investment effect. But, that is not the entire story. According to the interaction
term, rules significantly dampen the ability for investors to elicit higher returns through
higher investment levels. Further, part of the increase in the overall return rate is driven
by the mechanical effect of increasing lower bounds on returns. This does not address
whether rules affect reciprocity or trustworthiness itself.
The negative interaction term in equation (4) indicates that higher minimum
return rules dampen the ability of investors to elicit trustworthy behavior through higher
investment levels. We conjecture that this arises because higher rules constrain the
information space available capable of demonstrating to trustees whether investors are
actually “trustors”. Increasing minimum return rules reduces demonstrable trust by
11

Of course, we could effectively estimate the same combined effects by first estimating the effect of rules
on trust by estimating equation (1), then using the residual trust from that regression, linear and squared
rules and combinations of interaction terms. However, this unnecessarily complicates the interpretation of
the results.
12
Note that the non-linear effects of rules on investment capture a non-linear indirect effect that can
account for a “U-shaped” response function. Adding a second order term on rules along with the
interaction between investment and the rule squared changes some point estimates, but it doesn’t
change signs, significance levels or interpretations of this or any of the subsequent regressions.
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increasing the limits on downside risk that investors can demonstrate. To understand
how much of the interaction effect is due to this reduction in value at risk caused by
increasing minimum return rules, we re-run the regression using value at risk as the
independent variable representing trust directly. As a result, we will label VAR as Trust
in the regression. This results in the following estimated relationship:
−5.56% + 5.56%Trust
Return
−1.17
8.13***
=
+122.22%Rule
−
7.94%Interaction
+ε
Rate
−1.17
3.92***

Obs. = 82
Pseudo R 2 = 27.90%

(5)

where t-statistics are given below each coefficient, “***” denotes significance at the 99%
€ level of confidence, Trust is measured by the dollar Value at Risk (VAR) taken on by the

investor (jointly determined by the investment level and the rule), Rule is measured as a
decimal and Interaction is Trust times Rule. Notice that the interaction term ceases to
be significant. According to the pseudo R2, we have lost little explanatory power.
To understand how much of the direct rule effect is due to the mechanical
increase in minimum mandated returns and separate out the effects on discretionary
returns, we re-run the regression using the discretionary return rate as the dependent
variable. This subtracts out the non-voluntary component of the return rate and focuses
solely on the discretionary reciprocity or trustworthiness voluntarily displayed by the
trustee (that is, the return rate given above the mandatory minimum). Estimation of this
relationship gives:
Discrentionary
Return Rate =
(Trustworthiness)

−5.56% + 5.56%Trust
***
−1.17

8.13

+ 22.22%Rule − 7.94%Interaction + ε
1.08

−1.17

€
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Obs. = 82
(6)
Pseudo R 2 = 29.53%

where t-statistics are given below each coefficient, Trust is measured by the value at
risk (VAR), Rule is measured as a decimal and Interaction is Trust times Rule.13
Notice that the only thing that has changed is the coefficient on Rule and its
significance. This is because we have subtracted out exactly one times the rule (see
Table 1 for the exact definition) in each observation to arrive at the discretionary returns.
All other variations in returns are purely discretionary. The remaining direct effect of the
rule on trustworthiness is not significant. That is, the entire significance of the rules’
direct effect is in the effect on higher mandated returns, not on the discretionary
behavior of trustees. In the end, the only significant effect on trustworthiness is through
the amount of trust displayed in the value at risk undertaken by the investors.
C

Summary of Regression Results
Combined, these regressions tell an interesting story. Equation (1) shows that

investment levels initially fall with 10% rule and, eventually, rise as the rule increases.
However, this rise is not due to more trust. Equation (2) shows that trust, as displayed
by the value the investors place at risk (VAR) declines with the rule. While the relative
amount invested increases, the rules prevent an overall increase in trust displayed by
VAR.
Equations (3) through (6) show that any positive impact of higher rules on return
rates does not result from the impact of higher rules on trustworthiness. Instead, any
potential positive effects come indirectly by promoting more investment or more trusting
behavior from investors. However, when rules are implemented, investment and trust

13

Nearly identical results hold if we scale the discretionary return when dividing by the amount available
(i.e., dividing by one minus the rule).
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both fall. This leads to lower return rates. As rules increase the minimum mandated
return, investment rates rise and increasing rules increase return rates.
Despite evidence that they encourage higher relative investment in their
extremes, higher rules inhibit the ability of investors to place themselves at risk and,
hence, demonstrate trust by placing value at risk. Further, as equation (6) shows, the
only significant factor driving trustworthy behavior (defined as returning more than the
mandated minimum) is the amount of trust demonstrated. With the 0% minimum return
rule, each additional dollar invested generates 5.56% in discretionary returns from the
trustee (increasing return on investment by more than 16 percentage points). With a
30% rule, the amount each additional dollar invested generates in discretionary returns
is cut to 1.37% (increasing return on investment by just over 4 percentage points).
In summary, with a 0% minimum return rule, investors break even on average.
However, investors can generate high returns by displaying trust through high levels of
value at risk. With a 0% rule, all of the reciprocity results from trustworthiness. Thus,
trust elicits trustworthiness. As larger minimum return rules are implemented, return
rates drop on average, then finally rise. The fall results from (1) less trust displayed by
investors and (2) less trustworthy behavior by trustees given a level of trust. As the rule
rises, return rates rise. However, this rise is driven by the higher mandated minimum
returns. While investment rises back up, increasing minimum return rules inhibit
displays of trust (as displayed by greater value at risk). As a result, trustworthy behavior
does not return.
Figure 9 shows the overall relationship between rules, investment, trust and
trustworthiness. Level of investment is measured by the percentage of the endowment
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invested. Level of trust is measured by the amount investors put at risk (VAR). The
levels of trustworthiness are measured as the discretionary return rate (i.e., the return
rate minus the required return rate). Notice that in spite of skyrocketing investment as
the rule rises to 30%, the levels of trust and trustworthiness remain low.
V

Discussion and Conclusions

We study the interaction of exogenously imposed formal rules and behavior in games
where economic efficiency and the distribution of resources depend on trust and
reciprocity. Understanding this interaction is important. Social contracts commonly
depend on trusting and reciprocating relationships. They enable resource exchange in
small-scale subsistence societies and in modern economies these relationships
determine outcomes in conjunction with formal rules and explicit contracting. Trust and
trustworthiness remain fundamental components of efficient interactions.
Interactions that require trust involve a basic social dilemma where agents have
to trade off self-interest and safety with the potential social benefits that arise from
trusting behavior. For example, in the trust game, trust leads to net gains overall and
creates possible profits for investors but also creates a risk of net loss if trustees do not
reciprocate. On the other hand, failure to trust eliminates entirely the potential gain.
Effectively, this is a situation of nothing ventured, nothing gained. Trustees must trade
off personal gains from keeping money given to them with generating social reputational
value by demonstrating trustworthiness through voluntarily returning funds to investors.
We argue that one incentive for investors offsetting the financial risk of investing
in trustees is that they acquire information about the trustworthiness of exchange
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partners in general.14 Trustees demonstrate trustworthiness by voluntarily giving back
some of their profits to investors. While minimum return rules reduce downside risk for
investors, they may also limit the information generating potential of the exchange by
constraining the amount that can be returned voluntarily.15 While reduced downside risk
should encourage investment, limited information potential may discourage it. Our
results indicate both factors are important.
We argue that, by voluntarily returning funds, trustees invest in the general stock
of social/informational capital at their own expense. Without minimum return rules,
trustees have to decide how much to return based on their own expectations about the
value of information and what should be done in context. Rules restrict their ability to
show trustworthiness through voluntary discretionary reciprocity. Rules may also serve
to calibrate expectations indicating what return rates are “good enough” and, as a result,
behavior may effectively fall to the rule. For either or both of the above reasons, our
results indicate that this is exactly the case. Without a rule, trustee return rates rise
above self-interest. With a rule, they fall to near the minimum necessary.16
14

While we study a single, anonymous interaction, we believe trust and reciprocity are rooted in a
complex set of social interactions, experience, and evolved computational psychology that integrate
information and apply our gathered knowledge. Every opportunity to show trust and trustworthiness builds
the stock of reputational information that people can potentially capitalize on or computationally apply to
contextualized interactions. In the trust game, investors are making choices that not only affect their
immediate payoffs, but also allow them to learn about the reputations of the trustees that they may find
valuable in their own right, in future trust and investment games, or in other potential interactions or
applications.
15

Consider a real world situation: credit scores. One way to establish a high credit score is to take out a
loan and pay it back. A simple way to do this is to put a balance on a credit card and pay it off. This
shows that you are a responsible borrower; you establish a reputation for repayment through your credit
score and, in turn, affect future borrowing opportunities. We argue that, if a borrower repays a loan when
there is no minimum payment, it would generate the most reputational information. Paying off the loan
over time by making minimum payments mandated by a minimum payment rule inhibits reputation
formation and, hence, may limit future opportunities that depend on credit ratings such as future loans,
job opportunities, security clearances, etc.
16

Alternatively, the rules may form a focal point that attracts both investor and trustee behavior. Among
others, Cooper, DeJong, Forsythe and Ross (1990) and Mehta, Starmer and Sugden (1994) argue that
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Modern economic and social systems present many challenges to building and
maintaining trust relationships. In large systems, relationships become numerous,
impersonal and onerous to monitor. It becomes difficult to socially sanction
untrustworthy behavior (e.g. with ostracism, shunning, or negative gossip). Trust may
be compromised (Khalil, 1994). Nevertheless, cross-national studies of trust indices
suggest that populations that can rely upon well-developed social and legal
mechanisms for limiting opportunism have higher levels of trust (Zak and Knack, 2001).
At the margin, do simple minimum return rules encourage or discourage trust and
trustworthy behaviors? Overall, we find that by experimentally increasing rules’ control
over returned investments trust and trustworthiness does not increase. Trustworthiness
measured by the median level of voluntary discretionary returns to investors, virtually
disappears with rules. Further, while returns increase when the minimum required return
increases, voluntary displays of trustworthiness never recover. The median investment
level also falls when a minimum return rule is imposed. While investment levels rise
under sufficiently high return rules, this does not represent a return to trusting behavior.
It reflects the simple fact that investors have less at risk. Thus, rules limiting investors’
downside-risk decrease both trust and trustworthy behavior. Only sufficiently restrictive
rules increase investment in spite of the lost of trust.

focal points serve as equilibrium selection criteria in coordination games. Binmore, Swierzbinski and
Proulx (1993) argue specifically that common experience can create focal points that determine
equilibrium selection in bargaining games. Here, a 50/50 split of the cash is a simple focal point that may
explain behavior in the absence of a return rule. When a rule is introduced, the rule may serve as a
second possible focal point. As a result, trustees may return exactly the amount mandated by the rule.
Fearing this, investors may not send any cash in the first place. In the context of our one-shot experiment,
any reduction in investment resulting from the reduced information space or from the focal point is
observationally equivalent. Future research should focus on how to distinguish between these two
alternative motivations.
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We study a relatively abstract and simple game, stripping away many of the
complexities of social context. This allows a detailed understanding of a simple
interaction. However, there are many analogs in more complex environments and some
tantalizing field evidence on the interaction between rules and behavior that accord with
our results. While it can create benefits, adding rules or enforcing them can be counterproductive, as the day care and worker monitoring examples show. Removing them can
improve outcomes. For example, the “Monderman Principal” of traffic control (e.g.,
Clarke, 2006) shows that removing curbs, lane markings, traffic signs, etc., can improve
traffic safety and reduce congestion. As Clarke (2006, p. 291) puts it: “The
driver…becomes an integral part of the social and cultural context. As a result, behavior
is controlled by everyday norms…” Our results are consistent with this from the opposite
direction: here, rules replace the behavior trustees would otherwise use.
We believe the implications are clear: If a system based on trust is not broken or
violations of trust are infrequent, it is wise to not tamper with it via rules imposing
minimum standards of behavior. Let sleeping dogs lie. However, if a trust-based system
is not functioning well in the absence of rules, it might be improved with the addition of
rules, but only rules that sufficiently restrict behavior.
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VII

Tables and Figures

Table 1: Summary of Treatments
Treatment
R0
R10
R20
R30

Description of Treatment
Trustee returns any portion of amount received
Trustee must return at least 10% of amount received
Trustee must return at least 20% of amount received
Trustee must return at least 30% of amount received

Number of Subjects
42
48
40
48

Table 2: Definitions of Investment, Return and Profit Rates
Term
Return Rate (Reciprocity)
Discretionary Return Rate (Trustworthiness)

Definition
(Amount Returned)/(Amount Received) if Amount
Received > 0 and not defined otherwise
(Amount Returned)/(Amount Sent) - Rule

Investment Rate

(Amount Sent)/Endowment

Value at Risk (Trust)

(Amount Sent)x(1-Rule)

Return on Investment

(Amount Returned – Amount Sent)/(Amount Sent)
if Amount Sent > 0 and 0 otherwise
(Investor Payoff – Endowment)/Endowment
= (Amount Returned – Amount Sent)/Endowment
(Investor Payoff)/(Investor Payoff + Trustee
Payoff)

Investor Net Profit Rate
Investor Percentage of Payoffs
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Table 3: Amounts Returned and Return Rates by Rule and Amount Sent
Panel A: Amount Sent > $0
% Returned
Return Levels
Return Rates
within $0.01
Median
Median
Rule
% of Obs.
of Minimum
Mean
Median
Mean Median Excess
Excess
0%
86%
17%
$6.65
$7.00
$7.00
29%
35%
35%
10%
88%
57%
$4.36
$1.50
$0.01
22%
10%
0%
20%
95%
42%
$5.23
$3.30
$0.55
30%
28%
7%
30%
100%
38%
$9.42
$10.00
$1.46
38%
36%
6%
**
Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic on Equality of Populations of Return Rates (3 d.o.f.):
10.898
P-value:
0.0123
Panel B: Amount sent greater than $0 and less than $5
0%
38%
25%
$1.59
$1.25
$1.25
15%
10%
46%
81%
$1.09
$1.05
$0.00
15%
20%
40%
50%
$1.64
$1.53
$0.15
29%
30%
21%
80%
$2.36
$2.70
$0.00
31%
Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic on Equality of Populations of Return Rates (3 d.o.f.):
P-value:
Panel C: Amount sent greater than or equal to $5
0%
48%
10%
$10.70
$11.50
$11.50
40%
10%
42%
30%
$7.95
$7.50
$5.55
31%
20%
55%
36%
$7.85
$8.00
$3.00
31%
30%
79%
26%
$11.29
$12.00
$3.00
40%
Kruskal-Wallis Test Statistic on Equality of Populations of Return Rates (3 d.o.f.):
P-value:
**
Significant at the 95% level of confidence.
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12%
12%
10%
0%
24%
4%
30%
0%
**
11.597
0.0089
45%
45%
37%
27%
30%
10%
40%
10%
5.174
0.1595

Table 4: Amounts Invested and Returns on Investment by Rule
Panel A: All Data
Return on Investment
Investor
Profit Rate
Mean
Med.

Investment
Rate
Mean
Med.

No. of
Obs.

Fraction
that
Invest $0

0%

21

14%

1.7%

0.0%

55.4%

45.0%

10%

24

13%

-7.9%

-7.0%

46.0%

38.8%

20%
20
5%
30%
24
0%
Kruskal-Wallis Test
Statistic
P-value

-3.3%
15.9%

-7.8%
6.3%

53.0%
78.3%

50.0%
100.0%

Rule

50.0%

55.0%

50.0%

52.9%
47.5%

50.0%
47.7%

9.539**

10.920**

1.241

0.0285

0.014

0.0229

0.0122

0.7432

11

27%

10%

14

21%

20%

9

11%

-4.9%

30%
5
0%
Kruskal-Wallis Test
Statistic
P-value

-1.9%

N/A
N/A

54.5%

10.615**

0%

10
10

Investor
Percentage
of Payoff
Mean
Med.

9.063**

11.8%
11.8%

0%
10%

Overall
Mean
Med.
12.0%
0.0%
28.6% 64.9%
-8.6% 15.1%
14.7%
9.3%

Positive
Investments
Mean
Med.
14.0%
5.0%
32.7% 69.9%
-9.1% 17.6%
14.7%
9.3%

Panel B: Amount sent less than $5
10.0% 23.4%
30.0% 40.8% 50.0%
-7.0% 20.4%
17.5% 43.6% 69.9%
-7.5% 19.5%
20.0% 12.2% 17.6%
-2.0% 25.5%
30.0% -8.0% 10.0%

56.1%
55.4%
13.8%
-8.0%

62.7%
70.0%
28.8%
10.0%

65.8%

60.0%

67.6%

71.9%

71.0%

65.7%

66.1%

62.5%

2.117

0.900

4.184

11.885**

0.341

0.5484

0.8255

0.2423

0.0078

0.9521

Panel C: Amount sent greater than or equal to $5
16.5% 27.5% 90.5% 100.0% 19.6% 35.9% 19.6%
-2.5% 10.0% 82.0%
95.0% -7.7% 10.0% -7.7%
-2.0% 10.0% 80.5%
90.0% -5.7% 10.0% -5.7%
20.6% 20.0% 92.2% 100.0% 20.7% 20.0% 20.7%

20%
11
N/A
30%
19
N/A
Kruskal-Wallis Test
5.529
Statistic
P-value
0.1369
**
Significant at the 95% level of confidence.

35.9%
10.0%
10.0%
20.0%

42.0%
37.3%

48.2%
42.7%

38.1%
42.6%

40.0%
46.2%

4.107

5.174

5.174

2.352

0.2502

0.1595

0.1595

0.5027
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Figure 1: Mean and Median Sent and Returned by Treatment
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Figure 2: Histograms of Return Rate as Fraction of Amount Received by
Treatment

Axis reports the percentage returned by the trustee given investment. Light bars
represent investments of less than $5, darker bars greater than $5.
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Figure 3: Histograms of Investments by Rule

Axis reports the dollar amount invested. Light bars represent investments leading to
zero or negative return, while darker bars represent positive return.
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Figure 4: Direct and Indirect Effects of Rules

Figure 5: Mean, Median and Predicted Median Investment Levels by Rule
(According to Equation 1)
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Figure 6: Mean, Median and Predicted Trust (as measured by Value at Risk)
Levels by Rule (According to Equation 2)
Mean Investment

$10
$9
$8
$7
$6
$5
$4
$3
$2
$1
$0

Median Investment

Predicted
Investment
Maximum VAR

0%

10%

20%

30%

Minimum	
  Return	
  Rule	
  

Figure 7: Mean, Median and Predicted Median Return Rates by Rule (According to
Equation 3)
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Minimum Return
Rate

Figure 8: Mean, Median and Predicted Median Discretionary Return Rates
(Trustworthiness) by Rule (According to Equation 6)
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Figure 9: Median Investment Rates, Values at Risk (Trust) and
Discretionary Return Rates (Trustworthiness) by Rule
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30%

VIII Appendix: Instructions for the R20 Treatment
INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Various research agencies have provided
funds for this research. The currency used in the experiment is experimental dollars, and they will be
converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of 1 experimental dollar to 1 dollar. At the end of the experiment your
earnings will be paid to you in private and in cash. It is very important that you remain silent and do not
look at other people's work. If you have any questions, or need assistance of any kind, please raise your
hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc… you will be asked to
leave and you will not be paid. We expect, and appreciate, you adhering to these policies.
THE EXPERIMENT
The participants in today's experiment will be randomly assigned into two-person groups. In addition to
the group assignment each participant will also be randomly assigned to a specific type in the group,
designated as Person 1 or Person 2. You and the other participant in your group will make choices that
will determine your payoffs. The experiment consists of two decision stages.
In stage 1, Person 1 receives $10 and then decides how many dollars to send to Person 2. Person 1 can
send none, more than none, or all of the $10 to Person 2. The amount sent by Person 1 is tripled before
reaching Person 2. In stage 2, Person 2 decides how many of the dollars they received to send back to
Person 1. Person 2 can send back 20%, more than 20%, or all of the amount received back to Person 1.
At that point the experiment is over.
Next we describe in details the decisions made by both persons in each stage of the experiment.
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Stage 1: Person 1 receives $10 and then decides how many dollars to send to Person 2. Person 1 can
send none, more than none, or all of the $10. Person 1 enters the amount sent to Person 2 in the box
labeled “The amount sent by Person 1” below. Person 1 keeps any amount that is not sent to Person 2.
The amount sent by Person 1 is tripled before reaching Person 2.
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Stage 2: After learning the amount sent by Person 1, Person 2 decides how many dollars to send back to
Person 1. Person 2 can send back 20%, more than 20%, or all of the amount in Person 2's account at
that time. Person 2 enters the amount sent back to Person 1 in the box labeled “The amount sent back by
Person 2” below. The amount sent back by Person 2 is NOT multiplied. Person 2 keeps any amount that
is not sent back to Person 1.

Finally, at the end of the Stage 2 the total earnings are reported to each person.
● Person 1's earnings will equal $10 less the amount sent to Person 2 plus the amount sent back
by Person 2.
● Person 2's earning will equal three times the amount sent by Person 1 less the amount sent back
to Person 1.
Please record the decisions and your earnings on your record sheet under the appropriate heading.
SUMMARY
The computer will assign you and one other participant to a two-person group, consisting of Person 1
and Person 2. In stage 1, Person 1 receives $10 and then decides how many dollars to send to Person
2. Person 1 can send none, more than none, or all of the $10. The amount sent by Person 1 is tripled. In
stage 2, Person 2 decides how many dollars to send back to Person 1. Person 2 can send back 20%,
more than 20%, or all of the amount in Person 2's account at that time. At the end of Stage 2 the total
earnings are reported to each person. This experiment is now over and your earnings will be part of the
total you will be paid.
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NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
We list hypothetical amounts below at $0.25 intervals to illustrate how the amount sent by Person 1 is
tripled, and how much Person 2 has to send back.
Then Person 2
Person 2 can send back
If Person 1 sends
Receives
between
0.00
0.00
0.00 - 0.00
0.25
0.75
0.15 - 0.75
0.50
1.50
0.30 - 1.50
0.75
2.25
0.45 - 2.25
1.00
3.00
0.60 - 3.00
1.25
3.75
0.75 - 3.75
1.50
4.50
0.90 - 4.50
1.75
5.25
1.05 - 5.25
2.00
6.00
1.20 - 6.00
2.25
6.75
1.35 - 6.75
2.50
7.50
1.50 - 7.50
2.75
8.25
1.65 - 8.25
3.00
9.00
1.80 - 9.00
3.25
9.75
1.95 - 9.75
3.50
10.50
2.10 - 10.50
3.75
11.25
2.25 - 11.25
4.00
12.00
2.40 - 12.00
4.25
12.75
2.55 - 12.75
4.50
13.50
2.70 - 13.50
4.75
14.25
2.85 - 14.25
5.00
15.00
3.00 - 15.00
5.25
15.75
3.15 - 15.75
5.50
16.50
3.30 - 16.50
5.75
17.25
3.45 - 17.25
6.00
18.00
3.60 - 18.00
6.25
18.75
3.75 - 18.75
6.50
19.50
3.90 - 19.50
6.75
20.25
4.05 - 20.25
7.00
21.00
4.20 - 21.00
7.25
21.75
4.35 - 21.75
7.50
22.50
4.50 - 22.50
7.75
23.25
4.65 - 23.25
8.00
24.00
4.80 - 24.00
8.25
24.75
4.95 - 24.75
8.50
25.50
5.10 - 25.50
8.75
26.25
5.25 - 26.25
9.00
27.00
5.40 - 27.00
9.25
27.75
5.55 - 27.75
9.50
28.50
5.70 - 28.50
9.75
29.25
5.85 - 29.25
10.00
30.00
6.00 - 30.00
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QUIZ
Before starting, we want you to answer some questions regarding the experiment to be sure you
understand what will follow. After five minutes an experimenter will return to privately review your
answers. Afterwards you will participate in the experiment only one time.
1. True or false: the amount sent by Person 1 is tripled before reaching Person 2's account.
2. True or false: the amount sent back by Person 2 is tripled before reaching Person 1's account.
3. What is the largest amount Person 1 can send to Person 2?
4. What is the smallest amount Person 1 can send back to Person 1?
5. If Person 1 sent $4.20 to Person 2, what is largest amount Person 2 can send back to Person 1?
6. If Person 1 sent $9.00 to Person 2, what is smallest amount Person 2 can send back to Person
1?
7. True or false: If Person 1 sends something to Person 2, then Person 2 has to send something
back to Person 1.
8. True or false: you will participate in the experiment one time.
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